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One of the simplest security proofs of quantum key distribution is based on the so-called comple-
mentarity scenario, which involves the complementarity control of an actual protocol and a virtual
protocol [M. Koashi, e-print arXiv:0704.3661 (2007)]. The existing virtual protocol has a limitation
in classical postprocessing, i.e., the syndrome for the error-correction step has to be encrypted. In
this paper, we remove this limitation by constructing a quantum circuit for the virtual protocol.
Moreover, our circuit with a shield system gives an intuitive proof of why adding noise to the sifted
key increases the bit error rate threshold in the general case in which one of the parties does not
possess a qubit. Thus, our circuit bridges the simple proof and the use of wider classes of classical
postprocessing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
attractive research areas in quantum information theory,
which has practical applications, and it has been inten-
sively investigated both experimentally and theoretically.
So far, many experiments of QKD have been reported
(see, for instance, [1]), and some of them have demon-
strated the actual distillation of the secret key [2]. Since
very hard work is needed for the actual implementation
of QKD, it would be good from an experimental view-
point if we could implement QKD with easier setups and
easier classical postprocessing parts.
From the theoretical point of view, it is very important
and interesting to consider a security proof in a simple
manner. One of the simplest approaches is to consider
a complementarity control of an actual protocol and a
virtual protocol [3], which the sender (Alice) and the re-
ceiver (Bob) can choose to execute, but cannot execute
simultaneously. In the actual protocol, the goal is to
agree on the bit values along the computational basis,
say the Z basis while, in the virtual protocol, Alice and
Bob collaborate to create an eigenstate of the X basis
(the conjugate basis of Z) in Alice’s side. With these
protocols, Koashi proved in [3] that the necessary and
sufficient condition for the secure key distillation is to
successfully execute these complementary tasks.
In this security proof, the virtual protocol has to be
constructed in such a way that an adversary (Eve) can-
not discriminate it from the actual one, and the existing
virtual protocol assumes the encryption of the syndrome
for the error-correction step [4]. Since the classical post-
processing is very important in QKD, it is interesting
to consider how to apply the complementarity control to
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QKDwithout the encryption, and even with wider classes
of classical postprocessing. An interesting type of post-
processing is the so-called noisy processing, which was
first introduced by Renner, et. al [5]. In this processing,
by intentionally adding noise to one of the partiesfsifted
key, the bit error rate threshold increases, and it is in-
teresting to consider how to explain this processing from
the viewpoint of the complementarity control.
In this paper, we remove the encryption by explicitly
constructing a qubit-based quantum circuit for the vir-
tual protocol, and we employ our circuit with a shield sys-
tem to give an intuitive proof of why the noisy processing
increases the bit error rate threshold. Thus, our circuit
bridges the simple security proof and the use of wider
classes of classical postprocessing. One of the features of
our quantum circuit is that it can output the syndrome,
apply bit-flip operations, discard any unnecessary qubit,
and output the secret key simultaneously. Thus, the vir-
tual protocol with our quantum circuit can be equiva-
lently converted to the actual protocol, and our circuit
can accommodate the use of one-way and bi-directional
error-reconciliation codes.
Our approach to noisy processing assumes that only
one of the parties has a qubit. This is one of the advan-
tages over the original proposal [5] or private state dis-
tillation approach [6], where both of the parties have to
possess a qubit. We note that we can apply our quantum
circuit to the security proof of protocols, such as BB84
[7], six-state protocol [8, 9], and other protocols where
the so-called phase error rate in the code qubits can be
tightly estimated, i.e., Bob can guess Alice’s fictitious X-
basis bit value with arbitrary small failure probability as
the size of the sifted key increases.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Sec. II,
we briefly review the security proof based on the com-
plementarity scenario [3, 10], and then we construct the
quantum circuit for a virtual protocol in Koashi’s proof
in Sec. III. Next, we apply our quantum circuit to the
following cases: (i) Alice has a fictitious qubit in Sec.
2IVA, (ii) both Alice and Bob have fictitious qubits in
Sec. IVB, and (iii) noisy processing in Sec. IVC. Fi-
nally, we summarize our paper.
II. REVIEW OF COMPLEMENTARITY
SCENARIO
A way to prove the security of QKD is to consider
a virtual protocol that is equivalent to the actual pro-
tocol and easy to analyze. Here, by “equivalent”, we
mean that the resulting secret key is the same between
two protocols and that all the information available to
Eve, including classical and quantum information, is the
same. The former requirement is the equivalence from
the users’ view, and the latter is the one from Eve’s view.
Thus, the security proved in the virtual protocol means
the security of the actual protocol. One approach along
this line is to consider a virtual protocol that is based
on the distillation of the Bell state [11–13] of the form
|φ+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0z〉|0z〉 + |1z〉|1z〉), which we call a Shor-
Preskill type of proof. In this approach, the final key is
generated via Z-basis (spanned by {|0z〉, |1z〉}) measure-
ment, and the high fidelity of the distilled state relative
to |φ+〉 guarantees the security since |φ+〉 is decoupled
with Eve’s system.
This proof can be seen from a different aspect. Since
|φ+〉 has no probability of having the bit (bit in Z-basis)
and phase (bit in X-basis: {|0x〉 ≡ (|0z〉+ |1z〉)
√
2, |1x〉 ≡
(|0z〉 − |1z〉)
√
2}) errors, one may conjecture that if Bob
can perfectly predict Alice’s measurement outcome re-
gardless of which basis was chosen (of course, these two
tasks cannot be performed simultaneously), Alice and
Bob can share the secret key. This is an intuitive idea be-
hind the complementarity control [10], and in [3] Koashi
formally introduced complementarity control of the ac-
tual protocol and the virtual protocol for the security
proof. In the actual protocol, Alice and Bob try to share
the same bit values in Z-basis, and Alice tries to gener-
ate a X-basis eigenstate with the help of Bob over the
quantum channel in the virtual protocol. From the view-
point of the Shor-Preskill type proof, the former (latter)
protocol is related with the fact that Bob can guess Al-
ice’s bit value in Z-basis (X-basis) if Alice and Bob share
|φ+〉. The actual protocol and virtual protocols are ex-
clusive of each other, and in order to prove the security
of the actual protocol, we require in the virtual protocol
that Alice’s and Bob’s operations must commute with the
measurement of the final keys, which is called nondisturb-
ing condition. Then, Koashi proved that the task of the
secret key distillation is equivalent to the complementar-
ity control of the two protocols, and the security of the
final key can be analyzed by the virtual protocol only.
As an explicit example of the virtual protocol, Koashi
proposed the virtual protocol with the encryption of the
syndrome [4]. Since the encryption gives Eve no informa-
tion, Alice and Bob can behave quite differently between
the actual and virtual protocols. More precisely, Alice
and Bob can choose any code, including nonlinear codes,
for the error-correction in the actual protocol while they
can perform any non-disturbing operations for Alice to
prepare the X-basis eigenstate in the virtual protocol.
This means that we do not need to consider the mea-
surement of the syndrome in the virtual protocol, which
makes the security analysis easy but limits classical post-
processing parts.
III. OUR CIRCUIT FOR THE VIRTUAL
PROTOCOL
In order to remove the assumption of the encryption,
we propose a quantum circuit that outputs both the syn-
drome for any linear codes and the required information
for the distillation of the X-basis eigenstate. Since our
circuit assumes a possession of qubits, it can be applied
to any party who has a fictitious qubit state, such as Al-
ice or a party with the squashing operator [14], with the
detector decoy [15], with a photon number resolving de-
tector, and with other techniques to define a qubit [16].
For the explanation, we assume that Alice has the fic-
titious qubit, and through Alice’s Z-basis measurement,
the sifted key is determined. Moreover, we concentrate
on the sifted key, and we consider only Alice’s side in
order to show that Alice’s key is independent of Eve’s
system. The actual protocol runs as follow.
Actual protocol:
(Step 1) Alice conducts measurements on her (n + s)
qubits, and she is left with (n+ s) bits of a sifted key.
(Step 2) Alice computes s-bit syndrome S
(A)
z for the
error-reconciliation protocol to be sent to Bob over a pub-
lic channel without encryption. Then, depending on the
error-correction codes and the syndrome from Bob, Alice
discards appropriate s bits and applies bit-flip operations
on the remaining n bits. At this point, Alice has an n-bit
reconciled key κ
(A)
rec .
(Step 3) Over a public discussion, Alice and Bob agree
on randomly chosen independent (n − m) n-bit strings
{~Vk}k=1,...,n−m. Alice takes {κ(A)rec · ~Vk}k=1,...,n−m as the
final key κ
(A)
fin .
Note that Step 3 corresponds to the privacy amplifi-
cation [20]. In order to prove the security of κ
(A)
fin we
propose the following virtual protocol (see also Fig. 1).
Virtual protocol:
(Step 1v) Alice prepares the first set of CNOT quantum
circuits (we call it CNOT(I)) and applies it to her initial
(n+ s) qubits.
(Step 2v) Alice conducts Z-basis measurements on s
qubits of the output ports of CNOT(I) to obtain the
syndrome S
(A)
z [26] and sends it to Bob over a public
channel without the encryption. She discards the s mea-
sured qubits, and depending on the syndrome from Bob,
Alice applies bit-flip operations on some qubits among
the remaining n qubits.
(Step 3v) Alice prepares the second set of CNOT quan-
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FIG. 1: Schematics of our quantum circuit for the Virtual
protocol. “bit-flip” consists of the identity and the bit-flip
operation σˆx, and “Purification” tries to purify the (n −m)
qubits by using µB and S
(A)
x .
tum circuits (CNOT(II)), and she applies it to her n
qubits. Next, Alice generates m-bit syndrome in X-basis
S
(A)
x by measuring the m qubits of the output port of
CNOT(II) along X-basis, and after receiving an infor-
mation µB from Bob, Alice obtains (n−m) almost pure
and direct product qubit states in X-basis. The final key
κ
(A)
fin is obtained by performing Z-basis measurement on
the (n−m) qubits.
Note that CNOT(II) is chosen randomly among the
set of CNOT circuits with the following property: the
measurement on particular m output ports in X-basis
is the same as measuring {X ~Ui}i=1,2,..m (~Ui ∈ Fn2 ) of
the n input ports and the measurement on the remain-
ing n − m output ports in Z-basis corresponds to the
privacy amplification in (Step 3) of the Actual protocol,
i.e., the measurement of {Z ~Vk}k=1,2,..n−m (~Vk ∈ Fn2 ) on
the n input ports. Here, Z~x ≡ Zx1 ⊗ Zx2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zxn
with Z0 = 1 and Z1 = Z and similar for X . The first
property of CNOT(II) corresponds to the random hash-
ing along X-basis [11], and we note that if we make the
hashing random, then the privacy amplification becomes
automatically random and vice versa since ~Ui and ~Vi are
always orthogonal [27].
In (Step 3v) µB represents Bob’s measurement out-
come on his system, which is not necessarily the system
of qubits. We assume that µB gives Bob the estimation of
the n bits of Alice’s fictitious X-basis measurement out-
come XA with some uncertainty. The uncertainty will be
removed by Alice’s random hashing alongX-basis so that
she can distill a direct product of X-basis eigenstates and
generate the secret key. Here, note that µB is not used for
the later active quantum operation such as a phase-flip
operation. One of the important points in the Virtual
protocol is that since S
(A)
z and S
(A)
x are generated via
measurements on the different systems, these measure-
ments commute. Similarly, the final measurement along
Z-basis and the measurement of S
(A)
x also commute, and
the measurement of the final key in the virtual protocol
is the same as the one of the actual protocol thanks to
the property of CNOT(II). Hence, the newly introduced
measurement of S
(A)
x does not disturb any measurement
outcomes in the Actual protocol, and the Virtual protocol
is not equivalent to the Actual protocol from Eve’s view
with respect to µB and the measurement of S
(A)
x , which
can be removed without degrading the security as we will
see.
For the security proof of the Virtual protocol, we again
note that since CNOT(II) is chosen randomly and inde-
pendently, the measurement of S
(A)
x serves as a random
hashing [11] along X-basis, hinting that if the number of
the rounds of the random hashing is properly chosen, Al-
ice can generate an almost pure and direct product state
in X-basis. Actually, this is the idea used in the security
proof in [4], and its sketch of the proof is summarized
as follows. The proof starts with putting the assump-
tion that the uncertainty of XA from Bob’s view after
obtaining µB is, say nξ bits. More precisely, we make
the following assumption [4].
Assumption: There exists a set T
(n)
µB of n-bit sequences
with cardinality |T (n)µB | ≤ 2nξ for each µB, such that the
pair of measurement outcomes (µB ,XA) satisfies XA ∈
TµB except for an exponentially small probability η.
By invoking the random hashing argument in [11] and
by setting m as slightly larger than nξ, we can show
that 〈tx|σˆ|tx〉 ≥ 1 − η′ where η′ ≡ η + 2−nǫ. Here, |tx〉
is the n-qubit X-basis state that Alice thinks to have
successfully distilled and σˆ is the actually distilled state.
Note that the exponentially high fidelity guarantees that
κ
(A)
fin is composably secure [18].
Next, we convert the Virtual protocol to the Actual
protocol, i.e., we remove µB and S
(A)
x from the Virtual
protocol while we keep the final key the same. The im-
portant point is that we do not use the measurement
outcome of S
(A)
x and µB for any of the following active
quantum manipulations, such as bit-flip operations or
other quantum evolutions. Moreover, the measurement
of S
(A)
x commutes with the measurement of κ
(A)
fin . Thus,
even if we skip the measurement of S
(A)
x and sending µB,
the final key still remains exactly the same, which ends
the conversion, and only the fact that Alice could have
generated the almost pure state is enough to prove the
security.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF OUR CIRCUIT
So far, we have seen that the security can be proven
by making the Assumption. In what follows, we consider
three particular cases to see how to confirm Assumption.
(i) The first case, discussed in Sec. IVA, is that only
Alice has the fictitious qubits and the syndrome is sent
from Alice to Bob or bi-directionally [19]. (ii) The second
case, in Sec. IVB, is that both of Alice and Bob have the
4qubits, and a bi-directional code is used. (iii) Finally, in
Sec. IVC, we explain, by using our circuit with a shield
system, why noisy processing increases the bit error rate
threshold. This noisy processing was first introduced by
Renner, et. al [5] and later explained from the viewpoint
of Γ-state distillation [6].
For the discussion, we assume that thanks to the test
bits, Alice and Bob know the rate ep of the “phase er-
rors”, i.e., Alice’s bit value (X˜A), which could have been
obtained via the fictitious X-basis measurement on the
(n + s) qubits (code bits) and Bob’s prediction (µ˜B) on
X˜A differ. More precisely [20], for ǫ > 0
P(|ep − e(t)p | ≥ ǫ) ≤ O(n+ s)2−(n+s)ǫ
2
(1)
holds, where e
(t)
p is the phase error rate of the test bits.
The important point for all the cases (i)-(iii) is that Al-
ice can in principle write down the candidate for XA as
T
(n)
µ˜B ,e
(t)
p
or the candidate for X˜A as T
(n+s)
µ˜B ,e
(t)
p
, given µ˜B
and e
(t)
p . Another point is that CNOT quantum gates,
if we are only interested in a particular basis, can be ex-
pressed just as a linear and one-to-one function on the
binary bit space. For the explanation, let FCNOT (I) as
the linear and one-to-one function on binary (n + s)-bit
space, which corresponds to CNOT(I) in X-basis.
We remark that when one of the parties, say Bob, has
no fictitious qubit, but Alice has, and they use a bi-
directional code, we assume that Bob can simultaneously
output µ˜B and the syndrome for the bit errors S
(B)
z .
A. Only Alice has the fictitious qubit
Thanks to the estimation and Bob’s measurement, Al-
ice can write down the candidate for X˜A as T
(n+s)
µ˜B ,e
(t)
p
=
{µ˜B + ri}
i=1,2,...,2
(n+s)h(e
(t)
p +ǫ)
. Here, h(x) ≡ −x log x −
(1 − x) log(1 − x) and {ri}
i=1,2,...,2
(n+s)h(e
(t)
p )
represents
a set of independent (n + s)-bit strings that con-
tain at most (n + s)(e
(t)
p + ǫ) 1s. From T
(n+s)
µ˜B ,e
(t)
p
,
we can calculate the candidate for XA as T
(n)
µ˜B ,e
(t)
p
=
{Trn[FCNOT (I)(µ˜B+ri)]}
i=1,2,...,2
(n+s)h(e
(t)
p +ǫ)
, where Trn
means that we discard the last s-bit of each (n + s)-
bit string. Since FCNOT (I) is an one-to-one function,
|T (n)
µ˜B ,e
(t)
p
| ≤ 2(n+s)h(e(t)p +ǫ) holds, following that (n +
s)(h(e
(t)
p +ǫ)+ǫ′) rounds of the random hashing is enough
for Alice to distill the X-basis eigenstate. Here, ǫ′ is a
small positive number. We note that the key generation
rate G in the limit of large n can be written as
G = (n+ s)[1− h(e(t)p )]− (s+ d) , (2)
where, d is the number of bits that Alice discards when
Alice and Bob use bi-directional codes [19]. Note that the
security of Bob’s key follows from the direct application
of the complementarity scenario [3].
B. Both parties have the fictitious qubits
We assume that Bob has the same quantum circuit as
Alice, and Bob measures the first n qubits of the out-
put port of CNOT(I) in X-basis, whose outcome is n-bit
string µB. Like the case in (i), we can write down the
candidate for X˜A as T
(n+s)
µB ,e
(t)
p
= {F−1CNOT (I)(µ′B + ak) +
ri}
i=1,2,...,2
(n+s)h(e
(t)
p +ǫ),k=1,2,...,2s
, where ak is arbitrary 2
s
(n+s)-bit strings with the first n bits all being zero, and
µ′B is (n+s)-bit string with the first n bits being the same
as µB and all the last s bits being zero. Next, in order to
calculate the required quantity T
(n)
µB ,e
(t)
p
, we apply Alice’s
FCNOT (I) to each member of T
(n+s)
µB ,e
(t)
p
to obtain T
(n)
µB ,e
(t)
p
=
{µB+Trn[FCNOT (I)(ri)]}
i=1,2,...,2
(n+s)h(e
(t)
p +ǫ)
[21], where
we have used FCNOT (I)[F
−1
CNOT (I)(µ
′
B + ak)] = µB and
the linearity of FCNOT (I). Since FCNOT (I) is an one-
to-one function, |T (n)
µB ,e
(t)
p
| ≤ 2(n+s)h(e(t)p +ǫ) holds, again
following that (n+ s)(h(e
(t)
p + ǫ) + ǫ′) rounds of the ran-
dom hashing is enough for Alice to distill the X-basis
eigenstate. We note that the amount of the privacy am-
plification is determined by e
(t)
p , which means that the
security level of Alice’s and Bob’s keys are the same.
Note that the key generation rate G in the limit of large
n can be written as
G = (n+ s)[1 − h(e(t)p )]− (s+ d) . (3)
C. Noisy processing
In noisy processing [5], Alice randomly adds bit er-
rors to her sifted key with probability 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 ∧ q 6=
1/2. This process can be alternatively realized first by
preparing shields in the state |φq〉⊗(n+s)S where |φq〉S ≡√
1− q|0z〉S+√q|1z〉S , and then interacting each of them
with Alice’s code qubits via CNOT gate with the shields
being the control qubit with respect to Z-basis (see also
Fig. 2) [6]. The point is that the role of the target qubit
and the control qubit in CNOT is exchanged according
to what basis we are working on. Suppose that the state
of Alice’s code bit before the interaction is a classical
mixture of a pure state, say |Ψ〉C =
∑
~x∈T (n+s)
µ˜B,ep
α~x|e~x〉C
(
∑
~x∈T (n+s)
µ˜B,ep
|α~x|2 = 1) where ~x = (x1, x2, · · · , x(n+s))
is a (n + s)-bit string and |e~x〉 is the X-basis eigen-
state. Then, the CNOT transforms |φq〉⊗(n+s)S |Ψ〉C into∑
~x∈T (n+s)
µ˜B,ep
α~x(Z
~x|φq〉⊗(n+s)S )|e~x〉C , meaning that the in-
formation of Alice’s code qubit in X-basis is trans-
ferredthe to the shield, and the information is encoded
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FIG. 2: Schematics of the circuit for noisy processing. A dif-
ference from the circuit in Fig. 1 is the shield part whose
initial state is |φq〉
⊗(n+s)
S . Each code qubit is connected with
each shield via the CNOT gate, and PGM represents the
pretty good measurement.
in two nonorthogonal states |φq〉S and Z|φq〉S . Thus, by
using the information that can be extracted from mea-
suring the shield, Alice can reduce the amount of hashing
along X-basis, which enhances the bit error rate thresh-
old as well as increases the key generation rate.
In what follows, we assume that Alice first applies m
rounds of the random hashing to narrow down the set
of candidates T
(n+s)
µ˜B ,ep
to a smaller set Ωm, and then she
performs the fictitious measurement on the shield to iden-
tify the phase error pattern X˜A. Moreover, in order for
Z|φq〉S to represent the phase error between Alice and
Bob, we apply a phase-flip operation Z µ˜B to the shield
before measuring it. For simplicity of this discussion, we
redefine µ˜B+~x as ~x, µ˜B+X˜A as X˜A, and {µ˜B+~x}~x∈Ωm
as Ωm. Furthermore, we define |~x〉 ≡ Z~x|φq〉⊗(n+s)S .
What we have to construct is a positive operator valued
measure (POVM) [20] which can identify all the members
in {Z~x|φq〉⊗(n+s)S }~x∈Ωm with exponentially small failure
probability in (n + s). For the construction, we em-
ploy the idea of the so-called Pretty Good Measurement
(PGM) [20, 22]. Originally, PGM can discriminate all
the states in a subset of the set stemming from an Iden-
tically and Independently Distributed (IID) source, and
we cannot directly apply this idea to our case where all
the members in the whole set have to be identified and
{~x} is not stemming from an IID source [23]. However,
observe that T
(n+s)
µ˜B ,ep
is obtained via the classical random
sampling theorem or other estimation method, and this
set is very similar to the one stemming from an IID source
with the phase error rate ep, i.e., in either case the most
likely bit strings are those containing (n+s)ep 1’s. Thus,
we infer that if T
(n+s)
µ˜B ,ep
is contained in the typical space of
the IID source, then we can remove the limitation of the
IID. Actually, as we will see later, it can be shown that
this intuition with a generalized analysis of PGM solves
our problem.
First, we define ρˆ as (1−e(t)p )|φq〉〈φq|+e(t)p Z|φq〉〈φq|Z,
where e
(t)
p is the phase error rate of the test bit defined
in Eq. (1) and assume that ρˆ is diagonalized as
ρˆ = λ0|0˜〉〈0˜|+ λ1|1˜〉〈1˜|. (4)
We also define a˜ as an (n + s)-bit string with respect
to the {|0˜〉, |1˜〉} basis, and thanks to the Bernoulli trial
argument, we have for ω > 0 and (n+ s) > 0 [24],
P(||a˜| − (n+ s)λ1| ≥ (n+ s)ω) ≤ 21−(n+s)ω
2
,
(5)
where |a˜| represents the Hamming distance of a˜, and
we call the space spanned by a set of the {|0˜〉, |1˜〉}-basis
eigenstates with a˜ satisfying ||a˜|−(n+s)λ1| ≤ (n+s)ω as
ω-typical subspace. For later use, we define the projec-
tor onto this subspace as Pˆωλ , and note that the random
sampling theorem (Eq. (1)) states that
P(||~x| − (n+ s)e(t)p | ≥ (n+ s)ǫ) ≤ O(n + s)2−(n+s)ǫ
2
.(6)
Note that if we chose ǫ and ω such that ǫ ≤ ω then the
actual phase error pattern X˜A is included in ω-typical
subspace with exponentially close probability to 1. As
we will explain the details in the Appendix, by averaging
over the random hashing, POVM {Mˆ~x}
Mˆ~x
=

 ∑
~x∈Ωm
Pˆ (Pˆωλ |~x〉)


−1/2
Pˆ (Pˆωλ |~x〉)

 ∑
~x∈Ωm
Pˆ (Pˆωλ |~x〉)


−1/2
,
(7)
where Pˆ (|ψ〉) ≡ |ψ〉〈ψ|, we can identify any ~x ∈ Ωm with
probability exponentially close to 1 in (n+ s), i.e.,
EΩm
(
〈~x|Mˆ~x|~x〉
)
≥ 1− 6(n+ s)2
−(n+s)
(
ω2+ǫ log
(
e
(t)
p −ǫ
1−e
(t)
p +ǫ
· e
(t)
p
1−e
(t)
p
))
+ 2−(n+s)[−h(e
(t)
p )+S(ρˆ)+m/(n+s)−ǫ−ω] ,
(8)
where EΩm represents the averaging over the random
hashing, and S(ρˆ) ≡ −Tr(ρˆ log2 ρˆ). By combining Eq. (8)
with the failure probability of the random sampling for
the phase error rate from Eq. (6), the overall failure prob-
ability pfail of the identification of the correct phase error
pattern can be upper-bounded by
pfail ≤ 1− EΩm
(
〈~x|Mˆ~x|~x〉
)
+O(n + s)2−(n+s)ǫ
2
≤ 6(n+ s) · 2
−(n+s)
(
ω2+ǫ log
(
e
(t)
p −ǫ
1−e
(t)
p +ǫ
· e
(t)
p
1−e
(t)
p
))
+ 2−(n+s)[−h(e
(t)
p )+S(ρˆ)+m/(n+s)−ǫ−ω]
+ O(n+ s)2−(n+s)ǫ
2
. (9)
6Thus, in order for the failure probability to be exponen-
tially small in (n+s), we have to choose parameters such
that
ω =
√√√√ǫ log
(
1− e(t)p + ǫ
e
(t)
p − ǫ
· 1− e
(t)
p
e
(t)
p
)
+ δ
(10)
and
m = (n+ s)
(
h(e(t)p )− S(ρˆ) + ǫ+ ω + δm
)
, (11)
where δ and δm are small positive numbers. Eq. (10)
means that ω has to be larger than ǫ (assuming 0 < ω ≤
1), which confirms our inference. With the above choice
of the parameter sets, the fidelity F of the final state σˆ
with respect to the target X-basis eigenstate |tx〉, i.e.,
〈tx|σˆ|tx〉 is expressed as
F = 1− pfail
≥ 1− (n+ s)6 · 2−(n+s)δ − 2−(n+s)δm
− O(n+ s)2−(n+s)ω2 , (12)
and the key generation rate G in the limit of large n is
G = (n+ s)[1− (h(e(t)p )− S(ρˆ))]− (s+ d) . (13)
As an example, we consider BB84 and we assume that
the phase error rate and unprocessed bit error rates are
the same and we use an ideal error correcting code. It
follows that G is asymptotically given by
G ∝ 1− [h(e(t)p )− S(ρˆ)]
− h(e(t)p (1 − q) + q(1− e(t)p )) (14)
with e
(t)
p being the same as the bit error rate in the test
bits. In this case, it can be seen that the bit error rate
threshold is 12.4% with q → 1/2. This value matches
the rate provided by [5, 6]. Intuitively, when q is close to
1/2, Alice has to discriminate almost orthogonal states,
and a negligibly small amount of privacy amplification is
needed.
Moreover, our analysis can be applied to six-state pro-
tocol [8]. In order to compare the bit error rate threshold
given in [5, 6], we assume that Alice and Bob possess the
fictitious qubits. In this case, we can employ the mutual
information between the bit and phase errors to reduce
the amount of hashing along X-basis [25, 26]. Thus, the
phase error rate on the code bit is dependent on whether
there is a bit error or not, and we can apply our idea to
the cases with and without the bit error separately. The
resulting key generation rate G in the limit of large n and
s is
G = (n+ s)
{
1−
[
H(Z|X)−
1∑
i=0
p(X = i)S(ρˆi)
]}
− [H(X) + d] , (15)
where H(X)(= s) represents the Shannon entropy for
the bit error pattern, H(Z|X) represents the conditional
Shannon entropy of the phase error pattern given the
bit error pattern, and p(X) is the probability that there
is the bit error (X = 0) or not (X = 1). Moreover,
ρˆi is the density matrix conditional on X = i, and it
is obtained by replacing e
(t)
p in ρˆ with the phase error
rate probability conditional on the realization of X . By
performing the optimization again in terms of the bit
error rate threshold by varying q, we obtain the improved
bit error rate threshold 14.1% when q → 1/2. We note
that this rate matches the one given by [5, 6].
V. SUMMARY
In summary, we have constructed a quantum circuit
for the virtual protocol in the complementarity control
to remove the encryption of the syndrome. We applied
our circuit to the cases (i) Alice has a fictitious qubit,
(ii) both Alice and Bob have fictitious qubits, and (iii)
noisy processing. In noisy processing, our proof covers
the case where only one party has a qubit, which is a
generalization of the original proposal.
In the analysis of noisy processing, we have to discrim-
inate any state in a set with exponentially small failure
probability, and a bit string is encoded in the state and
the states are nonorthogonal each other. We have for-
mally shown that PGM can solve this problem, which is
a generalization of the original PGM idea in which some
states in the set have to be discarded and the states are
stemmed from an IID source.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix, we show that EΩm
(
〈~x|Mˆ~x|~x〉
)
is
exponentially close to 1 in (n+s) for any ~x ∈ Ωm. In the
analysis, we assumed that 0 ≤ e(t)p ≤ 1/2, and we used
some techniques from [20]. First, one can show that∑
~x∈Ωm
Mˆ~x = 1 {Pˆω
λ
|~x〉}~x∈Ωm ≤ Pˆ
ω
λ , (A1)
where 1 {Pˆω
λ
|~x〉}~x∈Ωm is the identity operator of the space
spanned by {Pˆωλ |~x〉}~x∈Ωm . This means that {Mˆ~x} and
an additional positive operator that corresponds to the
failure discrimination of a state on ω-typical subspace
form a POVM on ω-typical subspace.
7Next, a direct calculation shows that
EΩm
(
〈~x|Mˆ~x|~x〉
)
= EΩm
(
〈~x|(Pˆωλ Mˆ~xPˆωλ )|~x〉
)
= EΩm



〈~x|Pˆωλ

 ∑
~x′∈Ωm
Pωλ |~x′〉〈~x′|Pωλ


−1/2
Pˆωλ |~x〉


2

(A2)
Let us regard (〈~x|Pˆωλ )
(∑
~x∈Ωm P
ω
λ |~x〉〈~x|Pωλ
)−1/2
(Pˆωλ |~x′〉)
as the (x, x′) component of the matrix Γ1/2, which is
a real value, and by using y2 ≥ 2y − 1 for real y and
Γ1/2 ≥ 3Γ/2− Γ2/2 [20], we have
(Γ1/2|x,x)2 ≥ 2Γ1/2|x,x − 1
≥ 3Γ|x,x − Γ2|x,x − 1 . (A3)
Moreover, by using
Γ|x,x′ =
∑
y
(Γ1/2)x,y(Γ
1/2)y,x′ = 〈~x|Pωλ |~x′〉, (A4)
we have
EΩm
(
〈~x|Mˆ~x|~x〉
)
≥ 3〈~x|Pωλ |~x〉 − EΩm

〈~x|Pωλ ∑
~x′∈Ωm
|~x′〉〈~x′|Pωλ |~x〉

 − 1 .
(A5)
In order to evaluate 〈~x|Pωλ |~x〉 we consider 〈~x|(1 −Pωλ )|~x〉,
which is upper-bounded as
〈~x|(1 − Pωλ )|~x〉
= ((n+s)C|~x|)
−1 ∑
~ξ s.t |ξ|=|~x|
〈~ξ|(1 − Pωλ )|~ξ〉
≤
∑
~v(e
(t)
p )|~v|(1− e(t)p )(n+s)−|~v|〈~v|(1 − Pωλ )|~v〉
((n+s)C|~x|)(e
(t)
p )|~x|(1− e(t)p )(n+s)−|~x|
,
(A6)
where the last summation is taken with respect to all
(n + s)-bit string ~v, and 1 is the identity matrix of the
space spanned by all |~v〉. Since ρˆ⊗(n+s) =∑~v(e(t)p )|~v|(1−
e
(t)
p )(n+s)−|~v||~v〉〈~v| holds, we have
〈~x|(1 − Pωλ )|~x〉
≤ Tr
(
ρˆ⊗(n+s)(1 − Pωλ )
)
((n+s)C|~x|)(e
(t)
p )|~x|(1− e(t)p )(n+s)−|~x|
.
(A7)
Note that
((n+s)C|~x|)(e
(t)
p )
|~x|(1− e(t)p )(n+s)−|~x|
≥ 2
(n+s)h(
|~x|
(n+s)
)+|~x| log2 e(t)p +(n+s−|~x|) log2(1−e(t)p )
(n+ s)
,
(A8)
and its exponent is lower-bounded as
(n+ s)h
( |~x|
(n+ s)
)
+ |~x| log2 e(t)p
+ (n+ s− |~x|) log2(1 − e(t)p )
= (n+ s)
[
h
( |~x|
(n+ s)
)
− h(e(t)p )
]
−
[
(n+ s)e(t)p − |~x|
]
log2
e
(t)
p
1− e(t)p
≥ (n+ s)ǫ
[
−h′
(
e(t)p − ǫ
)
+ log
e
(t)
p
1− e(t)p
]
= (n+ s)ǫ log
(
e
(t)
p − ǫ
1− e(t)p + ǫ
· e
(t)
p
1− e(t)p
)
. (A9)
On the other hand, from Eq. (5), we have
Tr
(
ρˆ⊗(n+s)(1 − Pωλ )
)
≤ 21−(n+s)ω2 , (A10)
following that 〈~x|Pωλ |~x〉 is lower-bounded by
〈~x|Pωλ |~x〉
≥ 1− (n+ s)2
1−(n+s)
(
ω2+ǫ log
(
e
(t)
p −ǫ
1−e
(t)
p +ǫ
· e
(t)
p
1−e
(t)
p
))
.
(A11)
Next, we evaluate the second term of Eq. (A5)
EΩm

〈~x|Pωλ ∑
~x′∈Ωm
|~x′〉〈~x′|Pωλ |~x〉


= EΩm

〈~x|Pωλ ∑
~y∈T (n+s)µB,ep
θΩm(~y)|~y〉〈~y|Pωλ |~x〉


= 〈~x|Pωλ
∑
~y∈T (n+s)µB,ep
2−m|~y〉〈~y|Pωλ |~x〉
+ (1− 2−m) |〈~x|Pωλ |~y〉|2
≤ 〈~x|Pωλ
∑
~y∈T (n+s)µB,ep
2−m|~y〉〈~y|Pωλ |~x〉+ 1 ,
(A12)
where θΩm(~y) = 1 if ~y ∈ Ωm, otherwise θΩm(~y) = 0. In
the second equality, we used the fact that the bit string
corresponding to the actual error pattern X˜A ∈ T (n+s)µ˜B ,ep
is always selected as Ωm, and the probability that ~y 6=
X˜A ∧ ~y ∈ T (n+s)µ˜B ,ep is chosen as Ωm is 2−m. Observe that
2−(n+s)(h(e
(t)
p )+ǫ)
∑
~y∈T (n+s)µB,ep
|~y〉〈~y| ≤ ρˆ⊗(n+s) , (A13)
8and
〈~x|Pωλ ρˆ⊗(n+s)Pωλ |~x〉
≤ 〈ωtyp|ρˆ⊗(n+s)|ωtyp〉
≤ 2−(n+s)[S(ρˆ)−ω] , (A14)
where |ωtyp〉 is a state on the ω-typical subspace. Using
them, we have
EΩm

〈~x|Pωλ ∑
~x′∈Ωm
|~x′〉〈~x′|Pωλ |~x〉


≤ 2−(n+s)[−h(e(t)p )+S(ρˆ)+m/(n+s)−ǫ−ω] + 1 . (A15)
Combining all together, we have the final expression as
EΩm
(
〈~x|Mˆ~x|~x〉
)
≥ 1− 6(n+ s)2
−(n+s)
(
ω2+ǫ log
(
e
(t)
p −ǫ
1−e
(t)
p +ǫ
· e
(t)
p
1−e
(t)
p
))
+ 2−(n+s)[−h(e
(t)
p )+S(ρˆ)+m/(n+s)−ǫ−ω] .
(A16)
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